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Abstract. At Crypto’07, Goyal introduced the concept of Accountable Authority Identity-Based
Encryption as a convenient tool to reduce the amount of trust in authorities in Identity-Based
Encryption. In this model, if the Private Key Generator (PKG) maliciously re-distributes users’
decryption keys, it runs the risk of being caught and prosecuted. Goyal proposed two constructions:
the first one is efficient but can only trace well-formed decryption keys to their source; the second
one allows tracing obfuscated decryption boxes in a model (called weak black-box model) where
cheating authorities have no decryption oracle. The latter scheme is unfortunately far less efficient
in terms of decryption cost and ciphertext size. In this work, we propose a new construction that
combines the efficiency of Goyal’s first proposal with a very simple weak black-box tracing mech-
anism. Our scheme is described in the selective-ID model but readily extends to meet all security
properties in the adaptive-ID sense, which is not known to be true for prior black-box schemes.
Keywords. Identity-based encryption, traceability, efficiency.
1 Introduction
Identity-based cryptography, first proposed by Shamir [40], alleviates the need for digital cer-
tificates used in traditional public-key infrastructures. In such systems, users’ public keys are
public identifiers (e.g. email addresses) and the matching private keys are derived by a trusted
party called Private Key Generator (PKG). The first practical construction for Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) was put forth by Boneh and Franklin [8] – despite the bandwidth-demanding
proposal by Cocks [17] – and, since then, a large body of work has been devoted to the design
of schemes with additional properties or relying on different algorithmic assumptions [23, 5, 6,
36, 43, 7, 22, 12, 9].
In spite of its appealing advantages, identity-based encryption has not undergone rapid
adoption as a standard. The main reason is arguably the fact that it requires unconditional
trust in the PKG: the latter can indeed decrypt any ciphertext or, even worse, re-distribute
users’ private keys. The key escrow problem can be mitigated as suggested in [8] by sharing
the master secret among multiple PKGs, but this inevitably entails extra communication and
infrastructure. Related paradigms [21, 2] strived to remove the key escrow problem but only did
so at the expense of losing the benefit of human-memorizable public keys: these models get rid
of escrow authorities but both involve traditional (though not explicitly certified) public keys
that are usually less convenient to work with than easy-to-remember public identifiers.
In 2007, Goyal [24] explored a new approach to deter rogue actions from authorities. With
the Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE) primitive, if the PKG discloses a
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decryption key associated with some identity over the Internet, it runs the risk of being caught
and sued by the user. A-IBE schemes achieve this goal by means of an interactive private key
generation protocol between the user and the PKG. For each identity, there are exponentially-
many families of possible decryption keys. The key generation protocol provides the user with
a single decryption key while concealing to the PKG the family that this key belongs to. From
this private key, the user is computationally unable to find one from a different family. Hence,
for a given identity, a pair of private keys from distinct families serves as evidence of a fraud-
ulent PKG. The latter remains able to passively eavesdrop communications but is discouraged
to reveal users’ private keys. Also, users cannot falsely accuse an honest PKG since they are
unable to compute a new key from a different family using a given key.
Prior Works. Two constructions were given in [24]. The first one (that we call Goyal -1 here-
after) builds on Gentry’s IBE [22] and, while efficient, only allows tracing well-formed decryption
keys. This white-box model seems unlikely to suffice in practice since malicious parties can rather
release an imperfect and/or obfuscated program that only decrypts with small but noticeable
probability. The second scheme of [24] (let us call it Goyal -2), constructed on the Sahai-Waters
fuzzy IBE [36], can be extended so as to provide weak black-box traceability: even an imperfect
pirate decryption box can be traced (based on its input/output behavior) back to its source
although traceability is only guaranteed against dishonest PKGs that have no decryption oracle
in the attack game. However, Goyal -2 is somewhat inefficient as decryption requires a number
of pairing calculations that is linear in the security parameter. For the usually required security
level, ciphertexts contain more than 160 group elements and decryption calculates a product of
about 160 pairings.
Subsequently, Au et al. [3] described another A-IBE scheme providing retrievability (i.e., a
property that prevents the PKG from revealing more than one key for a given identity without
exposing its master key) but remained in the white-box model. More recently, Goyal et al. [25]
modified the Goyal -2 system using attribute-based encryption techniques [36, 26] to achieve full
black-box traceability: unlike Goyal -2, the scheme of [25] preserves security against dishonest
PKGs that have access to a decryption oracle in the model. While definitely desirable, this prop-
erty is currently only achievable at the expense of the same significant penalty as in Goyal -2 [24]
in decryption cost and ciphertext size.
Our Contributions. We present a very efficient and conceptually simple scheme with weak
black-box traceability. We prove its security (in the standard model) under the same assump-
tion as Goyal -2. Decryption keys and ciphertexts consist of a constant number of group elements
and their length is thus linear in the security parameter λ (instead of quadratic as in Goyal -2).
Encryption and decryption take O(λ3)-time (w.r.t. O(λ4) in Goyal -2) with only two pairing
computations as for the latter (against more than 160 in Goyal -2).
While presented in the selective-ID security model (where adversaries must choose the iden-
tity that will be their prey at the outset of the game) for simplicity, our scheme is easily
adaptable to the adaptive-ID model of [8]. In contrast, one of the security properties (i.e., the
infeasibility for users to frame innocent PKGs) was only established in the selective-ID setting
for known schemes in the black-box model (i.e., Goyal -2 and its fully black-box extension [25]).
Among such schemes, ours thus appears to be the first one that can be tweaked so as to achieve
adaptive-ID security against dishonest users.
Our scheme performs almost as well as Goyal -1 (the main overhead being a long master
public key à la Waters [43] to obtain the adaptive-ID security). In comparison with the latter,
that was only analyzed in a white-box model of traceability, our system provides several other
advantages:
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- Its security relies on a weaker assumption. So far, the only fully practical A-IBE scheme was
resting on assumptions whose strength grows with the number of adversarial queries, which
can be as large as 230 as commonly assumed in the literature. Such assumptions are subject
to a limited attack [16] that requires a careful adjustment of group sizes (by as much as 50%
additional bits) to guarantee a secure use of schemes.
- It remains secure when many users want to run the key generation protocol in a concurrent
fashion. Goyal -1 has a key generation protocol involving zero-knowledge proofs. As its secu-
rity reductions require to rewind adversaries at each key generation query, security is only
guaranteed when the PKG interacts with users sequentially. In inherently concurrent envi-
ronments like the Internet, key generation protocols should remain secure when executed
by many users willing to register at the same time. By minimizing the number of rewinds
in reductions, we ensure that our scheme remains secure in a concurrent setting. In these
regards, the key generation protocol of Goyal -2 makes use of oblivious transfers (OT) in
sub-protocols. It thus supports concurrency whenever the underlying OT protocol does. As
already mentioned however, our scheme features a much better efficiency than Goyal -2.
- In a white-box model of traceability, it can be made secure against dishonest PKGs equipped
with a decryption oracle3. In the following, we nevertheless focus on the (arguably more
interesting) weak black-box traceability aspect.
Organization. In the rest of the paper, section 2 recalls the A-IBE security model defined in
[24]. We first analyze the white-box version of our scheme in section 3 and then describe a weak
black-box tracing mechanism in section 4.
2 Background and Definitions
Syntactic definition and security model. We recall the definition of A-IBE schemes and
their security properties as defined in [24].
Definition 1. An Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption scheme (A-IBE) is a tuple
(Setup,Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Trace) of efficient algorithms or protocols such that:
– Setup takes as input a security parameter and outputs a master public key mpk and a
matching master secret key msk.
– Keygen(PKG,U) is an interactive protocol between the public parameter generator PKG and
the user U:
· the common input to PKG and U are: the master public key mpk and an identity ID for
which the decryption key has to be generated;
· the private input to PKG is the master secret key msk.
Both parties may use a sequence of private coin tosses as additional inputs. The protocol
ends with U receiving a decryption key dID as his private output.
– Encrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, an identity ID and a message m and
outputs a ciphertext.
– Decrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, a decryption key dID and a ciphertext
C and outputs a message.
– Trace given the master public key mpk, a decryption key dID, this algorithm outputs a key
family number nF or the special symbol ⊥ if dID is ill-formed.
Correctness requires that, for any outputs (mpk,msk) of Setup, any plaintext m and any identity
ID, whenever dID ← Keygen(PKG(msk),U)(mpk, ID), we have
Trace
(
mpk, dID
)
6=⊥,
Decrypt
(
mpk, dID,Encrypt(mpk, ID,m)
)
= m.
3 We believe that the Goyal -1 system can also be modified so as to obtain this property.
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The above definition is for the white-box setting. In a black-box model, Trace takes as input
an identity ID, the corresponding user’s well-formed private key dID and a decryption box D that
successfully opens a non-negligible fraction ε of ciphertexts encrypted under ID. The output of
Trace is either “PKG” or “User” depending on which party is found guilty for having crafted
D.
Goyal formalized three security properties for A-IBE schemes. The first one is the standard
notion of privacy [8] for IBE systems. As for the other ones, the FindKey game captures the
intractability for the PKG to create a decryption key of the same family as the one obtained
by the user during the key generation protocol. Finally, the ComputeNewKey game models the
infeasibility for users to generate a key d(2)ID outside the family of the legally obtained one d
(1)
ID .
Definition 2. An A-IBE scheme is deemed secure if all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversaries have negligible advantage in the following games.
1. The IND-ID-CCA game. For any PPT algorithm A, the model considers the following
game, where λ ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameIND-ID-CCAA (λ)
(mpk,msk)← Setup(λ)
(m0,m1, ID?, s)← ADec,KG(find,mpk)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dec : (C, ID)
99K Decrypt
(
mpk,msk, ID, C
)
;
KG : ID 99K Keygen(PKG(msk),A)(mpk, ID)
// ID 6= ID?
d?
$← {0, 1}
C? ← Encrypt(mpk, ID?,md?)
d← ADec,KG(guess, s, C?)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dec : (C, ID) 99K Decrypt
(
mpk,msk, ID, C
)
;
// (C, ID) 6= (C?, ID?)
KG : ID 99K Keygen(PKG(msk),A)(mpk, ID)
// ID 6= ID?
return 1 if d = d? and 0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is measured by AdvCCAA (λ) = |Pr[GameCCAA = 1]− 1/2|.
The weaker definition of chosen-plaintext security (IND-ID-CPA) is formalized in the same
way in [8] but A is not granted access to a decryption oracle.
2. The FindKey game. Let A be a PPT algorithm. We consider the following game, where
λ ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameFindKeyA (λ)
(mpk, ID, s1)← A(setup, λ)
(d(1)ID , s2)← Keygen
(A(s1),·)(mpk, ID)
d
(2)
ID ← A(findkey, s1, s2)
return 1 if Trace(mpk, d(1)ID ) = Trace(mpk, d
(2)
ID )
0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is now defined as AdvFindKeyA (λ) = Pr[Game
FindKey
A = 1].
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Here, the adversary A acts as a cheating PKG and the challenger emulates the honest user.
Both parties engage in a key generation protocol where the challenger obtains a private key for
an identity ID chosen by A. The latter aims at producing a private key corresponding to ID
and belonging to the same family as the key obtained by the challenger in the key generation
protocol. Such a successful dishonest PKG could disclose user keys without being caught.
Note that, at the beginning of the experiment, A generates mpk without revealing the master
key msk and the challenger runs a sanity check on mpk.
As noted in [24], it makes sense to provideA with a decryption oracle that undoes ciphertexts
using d(1)ID (and could possibly leak information on the latter’s family) between steps 2 and 3 of
the game. We call this enhanced notion FindKey-CCA (as opposed to the weaker one which we
call FindKey-CPA).
Finally, in the black-box model, instead of outputting a new key d(2)ID , the dishonest PKG
comes up with a decryption box D that correctly decrypts ciphertexts intended for ID with
non-negligible probability ε and wins if the tracing algorithm returns “User” when run on d(1)ID
and with oracle access to D.
3. The ComputeNewKey game. For a PPT algorithm A, the model finally considers the
following game:
GameComputeNewKeyA (λ)
(mpk,msk)← Setup(λ)
(d(1)ID? , d
(2)
ID? , ID
?)← AKG(mpk)∣∣KG : ID 99K Keygen(PKG(msk),A)(mpk, ID)
return 1 if Trace(mpk, d(1)ID?) 6=⊥ and
Trace(mpk, d(2)ID?) /∈ {⊥,Trace(mpk, d
(1)
ID?)}
0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is AdvComputeNewKeyA (λ) = Pr[Game
ComputeNewKey
A = 1].
The ComputeNewKey game involves an adversary interacting with a PKG in executions of the
key generation protocol and obtaining private keys associated with distinct identities of her
choosing. The adversary is declared successful if, for some identity that may have been queried
for key generation, she is able to find two private keys from distinct families. Such a pair would
allow her to trick a judge into wrongly believing in a misbehavior of the PKG.
In the black-box scenario, the output of the dishonest user consist of a key d(1)ID? and a
pirate decryption box D that yields the correct answer with probability ε when provided with a
ciphertext encrypted for ID?. In this case, the adversary wins if the output of TraceD(mpk, d(1)ID?)
is “PKG”.
In [14], Canetti, Halevi and Katz suggested relaxed notions of IND-ID-CCA and IND-ID-
CPA security where the adversary has to choose the target identity ID? ahead of time (even
before seeing the master public key mpk). This relaxed model, called “selective-ID” model (or
IND-sID-CCA and IND-sID-CPA for short), can be naturally extended to the ComputeNewKey
notion.
Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions. We use prime order groups (G,GT ) en-
dowed with an efficiently computable map e : G×G→ GT such that:
1. e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any (g, h) ∈ G×G and a, b ∈ Z;
2. e(g, h) 6= 1GT whenever g, h 6= 1G.
In such bilinear groups, we assume the hardness of the (now classical) Decision Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem that has been widely used in the recent years.
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Definition 3. Let (G,GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p and g ∈ G. The Decision Bilin-
ear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH) is to distinguish the distributions of tuples (ga, gb, gc,
e(g, g)abc) and (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) for random values a, b, c, z $← Z∗p. The advantage of a distin-
guisher B is measured by
AdvDBDHG,GT (λ) =
∣∣Pr[a, b, c $← Z∗p : B(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]
− Pr[a, b, c, z $← Z∗p : B(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) = 1]
∣∣.
For convenience, we use an equivalent formulation – called modified DBDH – of the problem
which is to distinguish e(g, g)ab/c from random given (ga, gb, gc).
3 The Basic Scheme
The scheme mixes ideas from the “commutative-blinding” [5] and “exponent-inversion” [37]
frameworks. Private keys have the same shape as in commutative-blinding-based schemes [5, 6,
43, 12]. At the same time, their first element is a product of two terms, the first one of which is
inspired from Gentry’s IBE [22].
According to a technique applied in [24], private keys contain a family number t that cannot
be tampered with while remaining hidden from the PKG. This family number t is determined
by combining two random values t0 and t1 respectively chosen by the user and the PKG in the
key generation protocol. The latter begins with the user sending a commitment R to t0. Upon
receiving R, the PKG turns it into a commitment to t0 + t1 and uses the modified commitment
to generate a “blinded” private key d′ID. The user obtains his final key dID by “unblinding” d
′
ID
thanks to the randomness that was used to compute R.
A difference with Goyal -1 is that the key family number is perfectly hidden to the PKG
and the FindKey-CPA security is unconditional. In the key generation protocol, the user’s first
message is a perfectly hiding commitment that comes along with a witness-indistinguishable
(WI) proof of knowledge of its opening. In Goyal -1, users rather send a deterministic (and thus
non-statistically hiding) commitment and knowledge of the underlying value must be proven
in zero-knowledge because a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm must be simulated (by
rewinding the adversary) in the proof of FindKey-CPA security. In the present scheme, the latter
does not rely on a specific assumption and we do not need to simulate knowing the solution of
a particular problem instance. Therefore, we can dispense with perfectly ZK proofs and settle
for a more efficient 3-move WI proof (such as Okamoto’s variant [34] of Schnorr [39]) whereas
4 rounds are needed4 using zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
3.1 Description
Setup: given λ ∈ N, the PKG selects bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ with a
random generator g $← G. It chooses h, Y, Z $← G and x $← Z∗p at random. It defines its
master key as msk := x and the master public key is chosen as mpk := (X = gx, Y, Z, h).
.Keygen(PKG,U) : to obtain a private key for his identity ID, a user U interacts with the PKG
in the following key generation protocol.
1. The user U draws t0, θ
$← Z∗p, provides the PKG with a commitment R = ht0 ·Xθ and
also gives an interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the pair (t0, θ),
which he retains for later use.
4 A similar modification can be brought to the key generation protocol of Goyal -1 to statistically hide the key
family number to the PKG and avoid the need for 4-round ZK proofs.
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2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge fails to verify.
Otherwise, it picks r′, t1
$← Z∗p and returns
d′ID = (d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
3) =
(
(Y ·R · ht1)1/x · (gID · Z)r′ , Xr′ , t1
)
. (1)
3. U picks r′′ $← Z∗p and computes dID = (d′1/gθ · (gID ·Z)r
′′
, d′2 ·Xr
′′
, d′3 + t0) which should
equal
dID = (d1, d2, d3) =
(
(Y · ht0+t1)1/x · (gID · Z)r, Xr, t0 + t1
)
(2)
where r = r′ + r′′. Then, U checks whether dID satisfies the relation
e(d1, X) = e(Y, g) · e(h, g)d3 · e(gID · Z, d2). (3)
If so, he sets his private key as dID and the latter belongs to the family of decryption
keys identified by nF = d3 = t0 + t1. He outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Encrypt: to encrypt m ∈ GT given mpk and ID, choose s $← Z∗p and compute
C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
=
(
Xs, (gID · Z)s, e(g, h)s, m · e(g, Y )s
)
.
Decrypt: given C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
and dID = (d1, d2, d3), compute
m = C4 ·
( e(C1, d1)
e(C2, d2) · Cd33
)−1
(4)
Trace: given a purported private key dID = (d1, d2, d3) and an identity ID, check the validity of
dID w.r.t. ID using relation (3). If valid, dID is declared as a member of the family identified
by nF = d3.
The correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that well-formed private keys always satisfy
relation (3). By raising both members of (3) to the power s ∈ Z∗p, we see that the quotient of
pairings in (4) actually equals e(g, Y )s.
The scheme features about the same efficiency as classical IBE schemes derived from the
commutative-blinding framework [5]. Encryption demands no pairing calculation since e(g, h)
and e(g, Y ) can both be cached as part of the system parameters. Decryption requires to compute
a quotient of two pairings which is significantly faster than two independent pairing evaluations
when optimized in the same way as modular multi-exponentiations.
In comparison with the most efficient standard model scheme based on the same assumption
(which is currently the first scheme of [5]), the only overhead is a slightly longer ciphertext and
an extra exponentiation in GT at both ends.
3.2 Security
Selective-ID Security. We first prove the IND-sID-CPA security under the modified DBDH
assumption (mDBDH).
Theorem 1. The scheme is IND-sID-CPA under the mDBDH assumption.
Proof. We show how a simulator B can interact with a selective-ID adversary A to solve a
mDBDH instance (Ta = ga, Tb = gb, Tc = gc, T
?= e(g, g)ab/c). At the outset of the game, A
announces the target identity ID?. To prepare mpk, B chooses α, γ, t∗ $← Z∗p and sets X = Tc =
gc, h = Tb = gb, Y = Xγ · h−t
∗
, and Z = g−ID
? · Xα. The adversary’s view is simulated as
follows.
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Queries: at any time, A may trigger an execution of the key generation protocol for an identity
ID 6= ID? of her choosing. She then supplies an element R = ht0 ·Xθ along with a WI proof
of knowledge of (t0, θ). The simulator B verifies the proof but does not need to rewind the
adversary as it can answer the query without knowing (t0, θ). To do so, it picks t1
$← Z∗p at
random and defines W = Y ·R · ht1 , d′3 = t1. Elements d′1 and d′2 are generated as
(d′1, d
′
2) =
(
(gID · Z)r′ ·W−
α
ID−ID? , Xr
′ ·W−
1
ID−ID?
)
(5)
using a random r′ $← Z∗p. If we set r̃′ = r′ − wc(ID−ID?) , where w = logg(W ), we observe that
(d′1, d
′
2) has the correct distribution since
W 1/c · (gID · Z)r̃′ = W 1/c · (gID−ID
?
·Xα)r̃′
= W 1/c · (gID−ID
?
·Xα)r′ · (gID−ID
?
)−
w
c(ID−ID?) ·X−
wα
c(ID−ID?)
= (gID · Z)r′ ·W−
α
ID−ID?
and X r̃
′
= Xr
′ · (gc)−
w
c(ID−ID?) = Xr
′ ·W−
1
ID−ID? . Finally, the “partial private key” (d′1, d
′
2, d
′
3)
is returned to A. Note that the above calculation can be carried out without knowing
w = logg(W ) or the representation (t0, θ) of R w.r.t. to (h,X) and B does not need to
rewind A.
Challenge: when the first stage is over, A outputs m0,m1 ∈ GT . At this point, B picks r? $← Z∗p
and defines a private key (d1, d2, d3) = (gγ ·Xαr
?
, Xr
?
, t∗) for the identity ID∗. It flips a fair
coin d? $← {0, 1} and encrypts md? as
C?1 = Ta = g
a C?2 = T
α
a C
?
3 = T C
?
4 = md? ·
e(C?1 , d1)
e(C?2 , d2) · C?3d3
.
We see that (d1, d2, d3) is a valid key for ID?. Since gID
? · Z = Xα = Tαc and h = gb,
C? = (C?1 , C
?
2 , C
?
3 , C
?
4 ) is a valid encryption of md? (with the exponent s = a/c) if T =
e(g, g)ab/c. If T is random, we have T = e(g, h)s
′
for some random s′ ∈ Z∗p and thus C?4 =
md? ·e(Y, g)s ·e(g, h)(s−s
′)t∗ , which means that md? is perfectly hidden since t? is independent
of A’s view.
As usual, B outputs 1 (meaning that T = e(g, g)ab/c) if A successfully guesses d′ = d? and 0
otherwise. ut
In the above proof, the simulator does not rewind the adversary at any time. The scheme
thus remains IND-sID-CPA in concurrent environments, where a batch of users may want to
simultaneously run the key generation protocol.
Also, the simulator knows a valid private key for each identity. This allows using Cramer-
Shoup-like techniques [19] as in [22, 29] to secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
The advantage of this approach, as we show in appendix A, is to provide FindKey-CCA security
in a white-box setting.
Unlike the Goyal -1 scheme, the basic system provides unconditional FindKey-CPA security:
after an execution of the key generation protocol, even an all powerful PKG does not have any
information on the component d3 that is eventually part of the private key obtained by the new
user.
Theorem 2. In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advantage in the FindKey-
CPA game.
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Proof. The proof directly follows from the perfect hiding property of Pedersen’s commitment
[35] and the perfect witness indistinguishability of the protocol [34] for proving knowledge of a
discrete logarithm representation. Since the commitment R = ht0 ·Xθ and the proof of knowledge
of (t0, θ) perfectly hide t0 to the PKG, all elements of Z∗p are equally likely values of d3 = t0 + t1
as for the last part of the user’s eventual private key. ut
Appendix A describes a hybrid variant of the scheme that provides white-box FindKey-CCA
security using authenticated symmetric encryption in the fashion of [30, 41, 27] so as to reject
all invalid ciphertexts with high probability.
Theorem 3. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, any PPT adversary has negligible
advantage assuming that the Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof. For simplicity, we prove the result using an equivalent formulation of the Diffie-Hellman
problem which is to find h1/x given (g, h,X = gx).
At the outset of the game, A declares the identity ID? for which she aims at finding two
private keys d(1)ID? , d
(2)
ID? comprising distinct values of d3 = t. Then, the simulator B prepares the
PKG’s public key as follows. Elements h and X are taken from the modified Diffie-Hellman
instance (g, h,X). As in the proof of theorem 1, B defines Z = g−ID? ·Xα for a randomly chosen
α
$← Z∗p. To define Y , it chooses random values γ, t′1
$← Z∗p and sets Y = Xγ · h−t
′
1 .
Queries: in this game, A is allowed to query executions of the key generation protocol w.r.t.
any identity, including ID?. The only requirement is that queried identities be distinct.
- For an identity ID 6= ID?, B can proceed exactly as suggested by relation (5) in the proof
of theorem 1 and does not need to rewind A.
- When ID = ID?, B conducts the following steps. When A supplies a group element
R = ht0 · Xθ along with a WI proof of knowledge of (t0, θ), B uses the knowledge
extractor of the proof of knowledge that allows extracting a representation (t0, θ) of R
by rewinding A. Next, B computes t1 = t′1 − t0 picks r
$← Z∗p and returns
(d′1, d
′
2, d
′
3) =
(
gγ+θ · (gID
?
· Z)r, Xr, t1
)
. (6)
To see that the above tuple has the appropriate shape, we note that
(Y ·R · ht1)1/x = (Y · ht0+t1 ·Xθ)1/x = (Y · ht′1 ·Xθ)1/x = gγ+θ.
Output: upon its termination, A is expected to come up with distinct valid private keys
d
(1)
ID? = (d
(1)
1 , d
(1)
2 , d
(1)
3 ) and d
(2)
ID? = (d
(2)
1 , d
(2)
2 , d
(2)
3 ), such that t = d
(1)
3 6= d
(2)
3 = t
′, for the
identity ID?. Given that we must have
d
(1)
1 = (Y · h
t)1/x ·Xαr d(1)2 = X
r
d
(2)
1 = (Y · h
t′)1/x ·Xαr′ d(2)2 = X
r′
for some values r, r′ ∈ Zp, B can extract h1/x =
(
d
(1)
1 /d
(1)
2
α
d
(2)
1 /d
(2)
2
α
) 1
t−t′
. ut
We note that, in the above proof, the simulator does not have to rewind all executions of the key
generation protocol but only one, when the adversary asks for a private key corresponding to
the target identity ID? (recall that all queries involve distinct identities). Given that the number
of rewinds is constant, the proof still goes through when the simulator is presented with many
concurrent key generation queries. If other executions of the protocol (that necessarily involve
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identities ID 6= ID?) are nested within the one being rewinded when dealing with ID?, the
simulator simply runs them as an honest verifier would in the proof of knowledge and calculates
the PKG’s output as per relation (5) in the proof of theorem 1. Thus, the initial rewind does
not trigger any other one and the simulation still takes polynomial time in a concurrent setting.
Adaptive-ID Security. The scheme can obviously be made IND-ID-CPA if Waters’ “hash
function” F (ID) = u′
∏n
j=1 u
ij
i – where ID = i1 . . . in ∈ {0, 1}n and (u′, u1, . . . , un) ∈ Gn+1 is
part of mpk – supersedes the Boneh-Boyen identity hashing F (ID) = gID · Z. The function F
is chosen so as to equal F (ID) = gJ1(ID) · XJ2(ID) for integer-valued functions J1, J2 that are
computable by the simulator. The security proof relies on the fact that J1 is small in absolute
value and cancels with non-negligible probability proportional to 1/q(n + 1), where q is the
number of key generation queries.
When extending the proof of theorem 3 to the adaptive setting, an adversary with advantage
ε allows solving CDH with probability O(ε/q2(n + 1)). The reason is that the simulator has
to guess beforehand which key generation query will involve the target identity ID?. If ID? is
expected to appear in the jth query, when the latter is made, B rewinds A to extract (t0, θ) and
uses the special value t′1 to answer the query as per (6). With probability 1/q, B is fortunate
when choosing j $← {1, . . . , q} at the beginning and, again, J1(ID?) happens to cancel with
probability O(1/q(n+ 1)) for the target identity.
4 Weak Black-Box Traceability
Theorem 3 showed the infeasibility for users to compute another key from a different family
given their private key. In these regards, a decryption key implements a “1-copyrighted function”
– in the terminology of [33, 28] – for the matching identity. Using this property and the perfect
white-box FindKey-CPA security, we describe a black-box tracing mechanism that protects the
user from a dishonest PKG as long as the latter is withheld access to a decryption oracle.
The tracing strategy is the one used by Kiayias and Yung [28] in 2-user traitor tracing
schemes, where the tracer determines which one out of two subscribers produced a pirate de-
coder. In our setting, one rather has to decide whether an ε-useful decryption device stems from
the PKG or the user himself.
TraceD(mpk, dID, ε): given a well-formed private key dID = (d1, d2, d3) belonging to a user of
identity ID and oracle access to a decoder D that decrypts ciphertexts encrypted for ID with
probability ε, conduct the following steps.
a. Initialize a counter ctr ← 0 and repeat the next steps L = 16λ/ε times:
1. Choose distinct exponents s, s′ $← Z∗p at random, compute C1 = Xs, C2 = (gID · Z)s
and C3 = e(g, h)s
′
.
2. Calculate C4 = m·e(C1, d1)/
(
e(C2, d2)·Cd33
)
for a randomly chosen message m ∈ GT .
3. Feed the decryption device D with (C1, C2, C3, C4). If D outputs m′ ∈ GT such that
m′ = m, increment ctr.
b. If ctr < 4λ, incriminate the PKG. Otherwise, incriminate the user.
The soundness of this algorithm is proved using a similar technique to [1]. To ensure the inde-
pendence of iterations, we assume (as in [1]) that pirate devices are stateless, or resettable, and
do not retain information from prior queries: each query is answered as if it were the first one.
Theorem 4. Under the mDBDH assumption, dishonest users have negligible chance to produce
a decryption device D that makes the tracing algorithm incriminate the PKG in the selective-ID
ComputeNewKey game.
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Proof. The tracing algorithm points to the PKG if it ends up with a too small value of ctr. The
latter can be seen as the sum of L = 16λ/ε independent random variables Xi ∈ {0, 1} having
the same expected value p1. We have µ = E[ctr] = Lp1. The Chernoff bound tells us that, for
any real number ω such that 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, Pr[ctr < (1−ω)µ] < exp(−µω2/2). Under the mDBDH
assumption, we certainly have AdvmDBDH(λ) ≤ ε/2 (since ε/2 is presumably non-negligible).
Lemma 1 shows that p1 ≥ ε−AdvmDBDH(λ), which implies
µ = Lp1 ≥ L(ε−AdvmDBDH(λ)) ≥
Lε
2
= 8λ. (7)
With ω = 1/2, the Chernoff bound guarantees that
Pr[ctr < 4λ] = Pr[ctr < µ/2] < exp(−µ/8) = exp(−λ).
ut
Lemma 1. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, if D correctly opens well-formed cipher-
texts with probability ε, the probability that an iteration of the tracing algorithm increases ctr is
at least p1 ≥ ε−AdvmDBDH(λ).
Proof. We consider two games called Game0 and Game1 where the adversary A is faced with
a ComputeNewKey challenger B and produces a decryption device D which is provided with
ciphertexts during a tracing stage. In Game0, D is given a properly formed encryption of some
plaintext m whereas it is given a ciphertext C where C3 has been changed in Game1. In either
case, we call pi (with i ∈ {0, 1}) the probability that D returns the plaintext m chosen by B.
In the beginning of Game0, A chooses a target identity ID? and the challenger B defines
the system parameters as X = gc, h = gb, Y = Xγ · h−t? and Z = g−ID? · Xα for random
α, γ, t?
$← Z∗p. Then, A starts making key generation queries that are treated using the same
technique as in the proof of theorem 3. Again, B only has to rewind the WI proof when the
query pertains to ID?.
At the end of the game, A outputs a decryption box D that correctly decrypts a fraction ε
of ciphertexts. Then, B constructs a ciphertext C as
C1 = ga, C2 = (ga)α, C3 = T, C4 = m ·
e(C1, d1)
e(C2, d2) · Ct
?
3
where T ∈ GT .
In Game0, B sets T = e(g, g)ab/c so that we have C3 = e(g, h)a/c and C is a valid ciphertext
(for the encryption exponent s = a/c) that D correctly decrypts with probability ε. In this
case, D thus outputs m′ = m ∈ GT with probability p0 = ε. In Game1, T is chosen as a
random element of GT and C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) has the distribution of a ciphertext produced
by the tracing stage and D must output a plaintext m′ = m with probability p1. It is clear that
|p0 − p1| ≤ AdvmDBDH(λ) and we thus have p1 ≥ ε−AdvmDBDH(λ). ut
The proofs of theorem 4 and lemma 1 readily extend to the adaptive-ID setting using the
same arguments as in the last paragraph of section 3. The system thus turns out to be the
first scheme that is amenable for weak black-box traceability against dishonest users in the
adaptive-ID sense. Due to their reliance on attribute-based encryption techniques (for which
only selective-ID adversaries were dealt with so far), earlier black-box or weakly black-box A-
IBE proposals [24, 25] are only known to provide selective-ID security against dishonest users.
As for the security against dishonest PKGs, we observed that, in the FindKey-CPA game,
the last part d(1)3 = t of the user’s private key is perfectly hidden to the malicious PKG after
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the key generation protocol. Then, a pirate decoder D made by the PKG has negligible chance
of decrypting ciphertexts where C3 is random in the same way as the user would. When the
user comes across D and takes it to the court, the latter runs the tracing algorithm using D and
the user’s well-formed key d(1)ID = (d
(1)
1 , d
(1)
2 , d
(1)
3 ) for which d
(1)
3 is independent of D.
Lemma 2. In the FindKey-CPA game, one iteration of the tracing algorithm increases ctr with
probability at most 1/p.
Proof. In an iteration of the tracing stage, D is given C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) such that C1 = Xs,
C2 = (gID · Z)s, C3 = e(g, h)s
′
and C4 = m · e(g, Y )s · e(g, h)(s−s
′)t for distinct s, s′ $← Z∗p. Since
D has no information on d(1)3 = t, for any plaintext m ∈ GT , there is a value d
(1)
3 that explains
C4 and it comes that D returns the one chosen by the tracer with probability 1/p. ut
Theorem 5. In the black-box FindKey-CPA game, a dishonest PKG has negligible advantage.
Proof. The dishonest PKG is not detected if it outputs a decryption box for which the tracing
ends with a sufficiently large ctr. From lemma 2, it easily comes that Pr[ctr ≥ 4λ] ≤ Pr[ctr ≥
1] ≤ L/p = 16λ/(εp) ≤ 16λ/(2λε). ut
To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks and preserve the weak black-box
property, we can use the Canetti-Halevi-Katz [15] technique or its optimizations [10, 11] that
do not affect the tracing algorithm.
5 Conclusion
We described the first A-IBE system allowing for weak black-box traceability while retaining
short ciphertexts and private keys. We also suggested a white-box variant that dwells secure
against dishonest PKGs equipped with a decryption oracle. In the black-box setting, it remains
an open problem to achieve the latter property without significantly degrading the efficiency.
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A A Variant with White-Box FindKey-CCA security
To achieve IND-sID-CCA2 security, we can hybridize the scheme using an authenticated sym-
metric encryption scheme (as defined in appendix B) as previously considered in [38, 29] in
the context of identity-based encryption. The obtained variant is reminiscent of a version of
Gentry’s IBE described in [29].
Setup: is the same as in section 3 except that the PKG now chooses two elements YA, YB
$← G
instead of a single one Y . An authenticated symmetric encryption scheme (E,D) of keylength
` ∈ N, a secure key derivation function KDF : GT → {0, 1}` and a target collision-resistant
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p are also needed. The master key is set as msk := x and the
global public key is mpk := (X = gx, h, YA, YB, Z,H,KDF, (E,D)).
.Keygen(PKG,U) : to obtain a private key for his identity ID, a user U interacts with the PKG
as follows.
1. U sends R = ht0 · Xθ to the PKG and proves his knowledge of the underlying pair
(t0, θ)
$← (Z∗p)2 in a witness indistinguishable fashion.
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof is incorrect.
Otherwise, it picks random values r′A, tA,1, r
′
B, tB
$← Z∗p and returns
d′ID,A = (d
′
A,1, d
′
A,2, d
′
A,3) =
(
(Y ·R · htA,1)1/x · (gID · Z)r′A , Xr′A , tA,1
)
d′ID,B = (d
′
B,1, d
′
B,2, d
′
B,3) =
(
(YB · htB )1/x · (gID · Z)r
′
B , Xr
′
B , tB
)
3. U computes dID,A = (d′A,1/g
θ · (gID · Z)r′′A , d′A,2 · Xr
′′
A , d′A,3 + t0) as well as dID,B =
(d′B,1 · (gID · Z)r
′′
B , d′B,2 ·Xr
′′
B , dB,3), for randomly chosen r′′A, r
′′
B
$← Z∗p so that
dID,A = (dA,1, dA,2, dA,3) =
(
(YA · htA)1/x · (gID · Z)rA , XrA , tA
)
(8)
dID,B = (dB,1, dB,2, dB,3) =
(
(YB · htB )1/x · (gID · Z)rB , XrB , tB
)
(9)
where tA = t0 + tA,1, rA = r′A+ r
′′
A and rB = r
′
B + r
′′
B. He checks whether dID,A and dID,B
respectively satisfy
e(dA,1, X) = e(YA, g) · e(h, g)dA,3 · e(gID · Z, dA,2) (10)
e(dB,1, X) = e(YB, g) · e(h, g)dB,3 · e(gID · Z, dB,2). (11)
If so, he sets his private key as (dID,A, dID,B) and the latter belongs to the family of
decryption key identified by nF = dA,3 = tA.
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Encrypt: to encrypt m given mpk and ID, choose s $← Z∗p and compute
C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
=
(
Xs, (gID · Z)s, e(g, h)s, EK(m)
)
where K = KDF (e(g, YA)s · e(g, YB)κs) and κ = H(C1, C2, C3).
Decrypt: given C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
and dID = (dID,A, dID,B), compute the plaintext m =
DK(C4) (which may just be ⊥ if C4 is not a valid authenticated encryption) using the key
K = KDF
( e(C1, dA,1 · dκB,1)
e(C2, dA,2 · dκB,2) · C
dA,3+κdB,3
3
)
(12)
with κ = H(C1, C2, C3).
Trace: given an alleged private key (dID,A, dID,B), with dID,A = (dA,1, dA,2, dA,3), for an identity
ID, check the validity of dID w.r.t. ID using relations (10)-(11). If valid, the key is declared
as a member of the family nF = d3,A = tA.
To prove the IND-sID-CCA security, we can apply the technique of [29], which in turn borrows
ideas from [30, 41, 27].
In the chosen-ciphertext scenario, the white-box FindKey security is no longer unconditional
but relies on the ciphertext integrity of the symmetric encryption scheme.
Theorem 6. The scheme is IND-sID-CCA secure in the standard model if the modified DBDH
assumption holds, if the symmetric scheme is a secure authenticated encryption scheme, if H
is target collision-resistant and if the key derivation function is secure. More precisely, we have
AdvCCAA (λ, `) ≤
qd + 2q2d
p
+ AdvTCR(λ) + AdvmDBDH(λ) + 3qd ·AdvCT-INT(`)
+ (2qd + 1) ·AdvKDF(λ, `) + AdvIND-SYM(`)
where qd denotes the number of decryption queries allowed to the adversary A and the advantage
functions against (E,D) are defined in appendix B.
Proof. Given in the full version of the paper [31]. ut
Theorem 7. The scheme is FindKey-CCA secure assuming the security of the key derivation
function and the (weak) ciphertext integrity of the symmetric encryption scheme. The advantage
of an adversary A making at most qd decryption queries is bounded by
AdvFindKey-CCAA (λ, `) ≤ 2 · qd ·Adv
CT-INT(`)
+ 2 · qd ·AdvKDF(λ, `) +
2q2d + qd + 1
p
.
Proof. Given in appendix C. ut
B Authenticated Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme is specified by a pair (E,D), where E is the encryption algorithm
and D is the decryption procedure, and a key space K(`) where ` ∈ N is a security parameter.
The security of authenticated symmetric encryption is defined by means of two games that
capture the ciphertext indistinguishability and ciphertext (one-time) integrity properties.
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Definition 4. An symmetric encryption scheme is secure in the sense of authenticated encryp-
tion if any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the following games.
1. The IND-SYM game. For any PPT algorithm A, the model considers the following game,
where ` ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameIND-SYMA (`)
K
$← K(`)
(m0,m1, s)← A(find, `)
d?
$← {0, 1}
c? ← EK(md?)
d← A(guess, s, c?)
return 1 if d = d? and 0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is AdvIND-SYMA (`) = |Pr[GameIND-SYMA = 1]− 1/2|.
2. The CT-INT game. Let A be a PPT algorithm. We consider the following game, where
` ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameCT-INTA (`)
K
$← K(`)
(m, s)← A(find, `)
c← EK(m)
c′ ← A(create, `, c)
return 1 if c′ 6= c and DK(c′) 6=⊥
0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is now defined as AdvCT-INTA (`) = Pr[GameCT-INTA = 1].
The notion of weak ciphertext integrity is defined in the same way but the adversary is not
allowed to see an encryption c under the challenge key K.
C Proof of Theorem 7
The proof proceeds again with a sequence of games, in all of which Si denotes the event that
the adversary A wins.
Game0: is the FindKey-CCA experiment. The dishonest PKG A generates the master public
key, chooses an identity ID that she wishes to be challenged upon. She interacts with the chal-
lenger in a key generation protocol, upon completion of which the challenger B obtains a decryp-
tion key consisting of two triples d(1)ID,A = (dA,1
(1), dA,2
(1), dA,3
(1)), d(1)ID,B = (dB,1
(1), dB,2
(1), dB,3
(1))
that should pass the key sanity check (otherwise, B aborts). At this stage, A knows t(1)B = d
(1)
B,3
but has no information on d(1)A,3 = t
(1)
A or on the values rA = logX(d
(1)
A,2) and rB = logX(d
(1)
B,2) (by
the construction of the key generation protocol). In the next phase, A starts making a number
of decryption queries that the challenger handles using (d(1)ID,A, d
(1)
ID,B). Namely, when queried on
a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4), B calculates
ψ =
e
(
C1, d
(1)
A,1 · d
(1)
B,1
κ)
e
(
C2, d
(1)
A,2 · d
(1)
B,2
κ)
· C
d
(1)
A,3+κdB,3
(1)
3
,
where κ = H(C1, C2, C3), K = KDF (ψ) and m = DK(C4) which is returned to A (and may be
⊥ if C is declared invalid).
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At the end of the game, A outputs a key (d(2)ID,A, d
(2)
ID,B) and wins if d
(2)
ID,A parses into
(dA,1(2), dA,2(2), dA,3(2)) such that dA,3(1) = t
(1)
A = t
(2)
A = dA,3
(2).
We note that decryption queries on well-formed ciphertexts do not reveal any information
to A (since all well-formed keys yield the same result). We will show that, provided all ill-
formed ciphertexts are rejected by B, A still has negligible information on t(1)A in the end of
the game. For convenience, we distinguish two types of invalid ciphertexts: type I ciphertexts
(C1, C2, C3, C4) are such that logX(C1) 6= logF (ID)(C2) (and can be told apart from valid ones
by checking if e(C1, F (ID)) 6= e(X,C2)), where F (ID) = gID ·Z, whereas type II ciphertexts are
those for which logX(C1) = logF (ID)(C2) 6= loge(g,h)(C3).
Game1: is as Game0 but B rejects all type I invalid ciphertexts (that are publicly recog-
nizable). Such a malformed ciphertext comprises elements C1 = Xs1 , C2 = F (ID)s1−s
′
1 and
C3 = e(g, h)s1−s
′′
1 where s′1 > 0 and s
′′
1 ≥ 0. Hence, the symmetric key K that B calculates is
derived from
ψ = e(g, Y s1A · Y
κs1
B ) · e(F (ID), X)
s′1(rA+κrB) · e(g, h)s′′1 (t
(1)
A +κt
(1)
B ) (13)
where κ = H(C1, C2, C3). Upon termination of the key generation protocol, A has no informa-
tion on rA, rB (as B re-randomizes its key). Even if κ was the same in all decryption queries
(which may happen if these queries all involve identical (C1, C2, C3)), the second term of the
product (13) remains almost uniformly random to A at each new query. Indeed, for each failed
one, A learns at most one value that is not rA + κrB. After i attempts, p − i candidates are
left and the distance between the uniform distribution on GT and that of e(F (ID), X)s
′
1(rA+κrB)
becomes at most i/p ≤ qd/p. Then, the only way for A to cause the new rejection rule to
apply is to forge a symmetric authenticated encryption for an essentially random key K. A
standard argument shows that, throughout all queries, the probability of B not rejecting a type
I ciphertext is smaller than qd · (AdvCT-INT(`) + AdvKDF(λ, `) + qd/p). It easily comes that
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ qd · (AdvCT-INT(λ) + AdvKDF(λ, `) + qd/p).
We now consider type II invalid queries. While A knows t(1)B , she has initially no information
on t(1)A and the last term of the product (13) is unpredictable to her at the first type II query. Each
such rejected query allows A to rule out at most one candidate as for the value t(1)A . After i ≤ qd
unsuccessful type II queries, she is left with at least p− i candidates at the next type II query,
where the distance between the uniform distribution on GT and that of ψ (calculated as per (13))
becomes smaller than i/p ≤ qd/p. Again, one can show that, throughout all queries, the probabil-
ity of B not rejecting a type II ciphertext is at most qd · (AdvCT-INT(`) + AdvKDF(λ, `) + qd/p).
Let us call type-2 the latter event. If all invalid ciphertexts are rejected, A’s probability of
success is given by Pr[S1|¬type-2] ≤ 1/(p− qd) ≤ (qd + 1)/p. Since
Pr[S1] = Pr[S1 ∧ type-2] + Pr[S1 ∧ ¬type-2]
≤ Pr[type-2] + Pr[S1|¬type-2]Pr[¬type-2]
≤ Pr[type-2] + Pr[S1|¬type-2]
≤ qd ·
(
AdvCT-INT(`) + AdvKDF(λ, `) +
qd
p
)
+
qd + 1
p
and |Pr[S0] − Pr[S1]| ≤ qd · (AdvCT-INT(λ) + AdvKDF(λ, `) + qd/p), the claimed upper bound
follows. ut
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